Abstract-This study uses a dynamic 5-bus test case implemented via the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed to investigate strategic capacity withholding by generation companies (GenCos) in restructured wholesale power markets under systematically varied demand conditions. The strategic behaviors of the GenCos are simulated by means of a stochastic reinforcement learning algorithm motivated by human-subject laboratory experiments. The learning GenCos attempt to improve their earnings over time by strategic selection of their reported supply offers. This strategic selection can involve both physical capacity withholding (reporting of lower-than-true maximum operating capacity) and economic capacity withholding (reporting of higherthan-true marginal costs). We explore the ability of demand conditions to mitigate incentives for capacity withholding by letting demand bids vary from 100% fixed demand to 100% price-sensitive demand.
I. INTRODUCTION

T
He U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in an April 2003 white paper [1] proposed a market design for common adoption by U.S. wholesale power markets. Core features of this market design include: central management and oversight by an independent market operator; a two-settlement system consisting of a bid/offer-based dayahead market supported by a parallel real-time market to ensure continual balancing of supply and demand for power; and management of transmission grid congestion by means of locational marginal pricing.
Joskow [2] estimates that over 50% of generating capacity in the U.S. is now operating under some variant of FERC's market design. Energy regions that have adopted (or plan to adopt) this design include the midwest (MISO), New England (ISO-NE), New York (NYISO), the mid-atlantic states (PJM), California (CAISO), the southwest (SPP), and Texas (ERCOT).
The complexity of FERC's market design -together with the relative recency of its adoption (implying short data series) -makes it extremely difficult to study its dynamic performance properties using standard analytical and statistical modeling tools. A key unresolved issue is the extent to which the complicated rules and regulations governing market operations under the design might encourage strategic bid/offer behaviors on the part of market participants that reduce overall market performance over time. A related issue is the extent to which grid congestion and load-pocket formation can be strategically manipulated to benefit certain market participants at the expense of others.
Fortunately, powerful new agent-based modeling tools are now available that can handle this degree of complexity. As detailed at [3] , these tools are already fruitfully being applied to the study of restructured wholesale power markets.
For example, in a series of studies ( [4] , [5] , [6] ) we study economic capacity withholding (reporting of higherthan-true marginal costs) by profit-seeking generation companies (GenCos) participating in a 5-bus wholesale power market operating under FERC's market design. The GenCos strategically determine their supply offers over time using VRE reinforcement learning, a variant of a stochastic reinforcement learning algorithm developed by Alvin Roth and Ido Erev ([7] , [8] ) on the basis of human-subject laboratory studies. These economic capacity-withholding experiments were conducted using the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed, an opensource computational laboratory specifically designed for the systematic experimental study of FERC's market design. 1 Also, Tellidou and Bakirtzis [10] study physical capacity withholding (reporting of lower-than-true maximum operating capacity) as well as economic capacity withholding within an agent-based computational modeling of an energy auction market operating over a two-bus transmission grid with a fixed daily demand (load) profile. Their simulated GenCos have constant marginal costs and decide on hourly point quantityprice supply offers via SA-Q learning, a modified version of Q-learning. Each GenCo has the same learning parameters. The authors find that the GenCos are able to learn over time to exercise capacity withholding even if the only information available to them is public price data.
In this study we extend this earlier work. We use the AMES test bed to conduct systematic physical and economic capacitywithholding experiments for a dynamic 5-bus test case under alternative demand-bid price sensitivity conditions ranging from 100% fixed demand (no price sensitivity) to 100% price sensitivity. GenCos and Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) participate in a day-ahead energy market operating over a 5-bus transmission grid with congestion managed by locational marginal pricing. As in actual ISO-managed energy markets such as the MISO [11] , the supply offers of the GenCos consist of reported marginal cost functions over reported operating capacity intervals and the demand bids of the LSEs are combinations of fixed demand bids and price-sensitive demand bid functions. The GenCos rely on VRE reinforcement learning to determine their reported supply offers over time.
Real-world restructured wholesale power markets are sequential open-ended games in that multiple participant traders must decide on bids/offers for electric power on a daily basis, with no fixed horizon. Presumably, then, the traders will attempt to optimize their learning methods over time as they gain market experience.
In recognition of this learning-to-learn issue, we take preliminary steps in this study to help ensure that the GenCos' learning methods are calibrated to their decision environment. We conduct initial experiments for the dynamic 5-bus test case with 100% fixed demand involving extensive parameter sweeps for key VRE learning parameters. We use these initial learning experiments to determine GenCo-individuated sweet spot VRE learning parameter values resulting in the highest daily net earnings for the GenCos. We then set each GenCo's VRE learning parameters to its sweet-spot values for all subsequent experiments.
Section II outlines the main features of the AMES test bed. Section III explains the experimental design used to explore GenCo capacity withholding under systematically varied settings for demand-bid price-sensitivity when GenCos have sweet-spot VRE learning capabilities. Section IV explains more carefully how we determined these sweet-spot VRE learning capabilities. Experimental findings for GenCo capacity withholding are reported in Section V. Concluding remarks are given in Section VI.
II. THE AMES TEST BED (VERSION 2.01)
A. Overview
This study uses Version 2.01 of the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed to conduct all reported experiments. AMES(V2.01) incorporates core features of the wholesale power market design proposed by the U.S. FERC [1] ; see Fig. 1 . A detailed description of these features can be found in materials provided at the AMES homepage [9] .
Below is a summary description of the logical flow of events in the AMES(V2.01) wholesale power market:
• The AMES wholesale power market operates over an AC transmission grid starting on day 1 and continuing through a user-specified maximum day (unless terminated earlier in accordance with a user-specified stopping rule). Each day D consists of 24 successive hours H = 00,01, ...,23.
• The AMES wholesale power market includes an Independent System Operator (ISO) and a collection of energy traders consisting of Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) and Generation Companies (GenCos) distributed across the busses of the transmission grid. Each of these entities is implemented as a software program encapsulating both methods and data; see, e.g., the schematic depiction of a GenCo in Fig. 2 • The objective of the ISO is the reliable attainment of appropriately constrained operational efficiency for the wholesale power market, i.e., the maximization of total net benefits subject to generation and transmission constraints.
• In an attempt to attain this objective, the ISO undertakes the daily operation of a day-ahead market settled by means of locational marginal pricing (LMP). Roughly stated, a locational marginal price at any particular transmission grid bus is the least cost of servicing demand for one additional megawatt (MW) of power at that bus.
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• The objective of each LSE is to secure power for its downstream (retail) customers. During the morning of each day D, each LSE reports a demand bid to the ISO for the day-ahead market for day D+1. Each demand bid Fig. 3 . AMES GenCos use stochastic reinforcement learning to determine the supply offers they report to the ISO for the day-ahead market.
consists of two parts: a fixed demand bid (i.e., a 24-hour load profile); and 24 price-sensitive demand bids (one for each hour), each consisting of a linear demand function defined over a purchase capacity interval. LSEs have no learning capabilities; LSE demand bids are user-specified at the beginning of each simulation run.
• The objective of each GenCo is to secure for itself the highest possible net earnings each day. During the morning of each day D, each GenCo i uses its current action choice probabilities to choose a supply offer from its action domain AD i to report to the ISO for use in all 24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1.
• Each supply offer in AD i consists of a linear marginal cost function defined over an operating capacity interval. GenCo i's ability to vary its choice of a supply offer from its action domain AD i permits it to adjust the ordinate/slope of its reported marginal cost function and/or the upper limit of its reported operating capacity interval in an attempt to increase its daily net earnings.
• After receiving demand bids from LSEs and supply offers from GenCos during the morning of day D, the ISO determines and publicly reports hourly power supply commitments and LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1 as the solution to hourly bid/offer-based DC optimal power flow (DC-OPF) problems. Transmission grid congestion is managed by the inclusion of congestion cost components in LMPs.
• At the end of each day D, the ISO settles all commitments for the day-ahead market for day D+1 on the basis of the LMPs for the day-ahead market for day D+1.
• At the end of each day D, each GenCo i uses stochastic reinforcement learning to update the action choice probabilities currently assigned to the supply offers in its action domain AD i , taking into account its day-D settlement payment ("reward"). In particular, as depicted in Fig. 3 , if the supply offer reported by GenCo i on day D results in a relatively good reward, GenCo i increases the probability of choosing this supply offer on day D+1, and conversely.
• There are no system disturbances (e.g., weather changes) or shocks (e.g., forced generation outages or line outages). Consequently, the binding financial contracts determined in the day-ahead market are carried out as planned and traders have no need to engage in real-time (spot) market trading. • Each LSE and GenCo has an initial holding of money that changes over time as it accumulates earnings and losses.
• There is no entry of traders into, or exit of traders from, the wholesale power market. LSEs and GenCos are currently allowed to go into debt (negative money holdings) without penalty or forced exit.
The activities of the ISO on a typical day D are depicted in Fig. 4 . The overall dynamical flow of activities in the wholesale power market on a typical day D in the absence of system disturbances or shocks is depicted in Fig. 5 .
B. Demand Bids and Supply Offers
On each day D, each LSE j reports 24 demand bids for use in the 24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1. The demand bid for hour H consists of a fixed demand bid p 
defined over a true purchase capacity interval 
defined over a true operating capacity interval
where p Gi (H) is real electric power (in MWs). The expression MC i (p Gi (H)) denotes GenCo i's true sale reservation value for p Gi (H), i.e., the minimum dollar payment it is truly willing to accept (per MWh) for p Gi (H).
On each day D, each GenCo i submits one reported supply offer to the ISO for use in each hour H of the day-ahead market for day D+1. This reported supply offer consists of a reported marginal cost function
defined over a reported operating capacity interval
where p Gi is real electric power (in MWs). The expression MC R i (p Gi ) denotes GenCo i's reported sale reservation value for p Gi , i.e., the minimum dollar payment it reports it is willing to accept (per MWh) for p Gi .
To avoid operating at a point where the true marginal cost of its last supplied MW of power exceeds the marginal benefit (received payment), GenCo i's reported marginal cost functions (5) lie on or above its true marginal cost function (3). In addition, to avoid infeasible commitments, GenCo i's reported maximum operating capacity Cap RU i in (6) never exceeds its true maximum operating capacity Cap U i in (4). Note from the above discussion that each reported supply offer for GenCo i can be summarized in the form of a vector (a
C. GenCo Costs and Net Earnings
Total variable cost refers to the costs sustained by a supplier that vary with the level of its operations, whereas fixed cost refers to the costs sustained by a supplier independently of its level of operations. Total cost refers to the sum of the two.
For the specific context at hand, the true total variable cost function for GenCo i for each hour H takes the form
and the true total cost function for GenCo i for each hour H takes the form
where p Gi denotes any real-power generation level in (4) . By definition, then, the fixed cost for GenCo i in each hour H takes the form TC i (0) = FCost i . Net earnings are defined as revenues minus true total variable cost. Suppose, in particular, that GenCo i is located at bus k(i) and is committed at a generation level p Gi at price LMP k(i) for hour H of the day-ahead market for day D+1. Then the the net earnings of GenCo i for hour H of day D+1 are given by
The net earnings of GenCo i over all 24 hours of day D+1, received in settlement from the ISO at the end of day D, are then given by
D. Determination of LMPs and Power Commitments
The AMES ISO computes hourly LMPs and power commitments for the day-ahead market by solving bid/offer-based DC Optimal Power Flow (OPF) problems that approximate underlying AC-OPF problems. To handle these computations the AMES ISO makes repeated calls to DCOPFJ, an accurate and efficient Java DC-OPF solver developed as open-source software by Sun and Tesfatsion ([5] , [6] ).
3 DCOPFJ consists of a strictly convex quadratic programming solver wrapped in an outer SI-pu data conversion shell.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
All market performance experiments reported in this study are based on a dynamic 5-bus test case characterized by the following structural, institutional, and behavioral conditions:
• The 5-bus transmission grid configuration is as depicted in Fig. 6 , with transmission grid, LSE, and GenCo structural attributes as presented in Li et al. [12] . 4 • The five GenCos in Fig. 6 are individual plant owners with distinct maximum operating capacities as follows: 110MW for GenCo 1 (G1); 100MW for GenCo 2 (G2); 520MW for GenCo 3 (G3); 200MW for GenCo 4 (G4); and 600 MW for GenCo 5 (G5). Note that the next-tolargest GenCo 3 is favorably situated in a potential "load pocket" with respect to the three LSEs.
• GenCo 4 (a "peaking unit" ) has the most costly generation. Next in line is GenCo 3. The three remaining GenCos 1, 2, and 5 have moderate costs.
• The daily fixed demand (load) profiles for the three LSEs are the same from one day to the next. As depicted in Fig. 7 , each daily fixed demand profile peaks at hour 17. • The VRE learning parameters for each of the five GenCos are set at "sweet spot" values for which the GenCos as a whole earn the highest average daily net earnings. 6 To control for purely random effects, we conducted thirty runs for each treatment using thirty distinct random seed values; see Li et al. [12] for the precise numerical values used. Also, unless otherwise indicated, experiments were conducted with all five AMES stopping rules flagged "on." The stopping day for each run is referred to as the final day for that run.
Our primary treatment factor is the extent to which each GenCo can exercise physical capacity withholding by reporting lower-than-true maximum operating capacities. As clarified more carefully in Section V, we investigate two shrinkage rates for reported maximum operating capacities: 5% shrinkage (relative to true maximum operating capacity); and 10% shrinkage (relative to true maximum operating capacity).
Another treatment factor we consider is relative demand-bid price sensitivity. As our measure for this factor, we construct a ratio R of maximum potential price-sensitive demand to maximum potential total demand. More precisely, for each LSE j and each hour H, let
In (11) the expression SLMax j (H) denotes LSE j's maximum potential price-sensitive demand in hour H as measured by 6 In particular, as explained in the following Section IV, we use Case(1,1) in Table I corresponding to the basic learning parameter settings α = 1 and β = 100. the upper bound of its purchase capacity interval (2), and
denotes LSE j's maximum potential total demand in hour H as the sum of its fixed demand p F Lj (H) and its maximum potential price-sensitive demand SLMax j (H) in hour H. The construction of the R ratio is illustrated in Fig. 8 .
For our price-sensitive demand experiments we start by setting all of the R values (11) for each LSE j and each hour H equal to R=0.0 (the pure fixed-demand case). We then systematically increase R by tenths, ending with the value R=1.0 (the pure price-sensitive demand case). A positive R value indicates that the LSEs are able to exercise at least some degree of price resistance.
The maximum potential price-sensitive hourly demands SLMax j (H) for each LSE j are thus systematically increased across experiments. However, we control for confounding effects arising from changes in overall demand capacity as follows: For each LSE j and each hour H, the denominator value MPTD j (H) in (12) 
Moreover, as R is incrementally increased from R=0.0 to R=1.0, we control for confounding effects arising from changes in the LSEs' price-sensitive demand bids by setting the ordinate and slope parameters {(c j (H),d j (H)): H=00,...,23} to fixed values for each LSE j. A listing of the specific numerical values used can be found in Li et al. [12] .
IV. PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF SWEET-SPOT VRE LEARNING PARAMETER VALUES
This section reports on initial learning experiments conducted with the dynamic 5-bus test case outlined in Section III with 100% fixed demand and no physical capacity withholding. The purpose of these initial learning experiments is to determine "sweet-spot" VRE learning parameter values for the GenCos that perform reasonably well for their particular decision environment.
Reasonability is judged in terms of the average daily net earnings (Avg DNE) ultimately attained by the GenCos as a result of the supply offers (actions) they learn to report to the ISO over time. Avg DNE is calculated as the daily net earnings (10) earned on the final day D averaged across all five GenCos and across all thirty runs.
As detailed in Appendix A, the VRE reinforcement learning algorithm for each GenCo i is characterized by the following four parameters:
• GenCo i's initial action choice propensity level q i (1), which determines GenCo i's initial aspiration level for daily net earnings at the beginning of day 1; • GenCo i's temperature cooling rate T i , which controls the extent to which differences in GenCo i's action choice propensities translate into differences in GenCo i's action choice probabilities; • GenCo i's recency parameter r i , which controls the relative weight GenCo i places on current versus past "rewards" (daily net earnings outcomes) when it updates its action choice propensity values; • GenCo i's experimentation parameter e i , which dampens the growth of GenCo i's chosen-action propensity levels and controls the extent to which a reward resulting from a currently chosen action affects GenCo i's updating of its action choice propensities for non-chosen actions. In extensive VRE learning experiments conducted for the benchmark dynamic 5-bus test case under alternative settings for the recency and experimentation parameters r and e over their full feasible ranges from 0 to 1, Pentapalli [16] determined that high Avg DNE outcomes were generally obtained with r=0.04 and e=0.96 for each GenCo. Consequently, throughout the present study we set r=0.04 and e=0.96 for each GenCo i.
Clearly the values set for the initial action choice propensity level q i (1) and temperature cooling rate T i for each GenCo i should reasonably be calibrated to the particular earnings opportunities it faces. The following normalization is used to achieve this individual calibration while minimizing the total number of parameter values to be experimentally determined.
We first define a derived parameter
where MaxDNE i is an estimate for GenCo i's maximum possible daily net earnings derived from its action domain AD i assuming "competitive" marginal-cost pricing (sales price = reported marginal cost). Specifically, letting s M axDN E i = 24 * max
7 Compare (16) with definition (10) for the actual net earnings of GenCo i over all 24 hours of the day-ahead market for day D+1 under LMP pricing. The LMP received by GenCo i at a positive generation commitment level p Gi in any hour H can exceed GenCo i's reported marginal cost at p Gi for hour H if GenCo i has a binding upper operating capacity limit at p Gi . This is why MaxDNE i is characterized as an estimate rather than a true upper bound for GenCo i's maximum possible daily net earnings. where the hourly net earnings function HNE(s
(17) Given a (typically) distinct positive value MaxDNE i for each GenCo i, a non-negative setting for α determines a distinct initial earnings aspiration level q i (1) for each GenCo i. Low α values correspond to pessimistic aspiration levels (relative to MaxDNE i ), and conversely.
We then define a second derived parameter
Given a non-negative value for α in (15) -and hence a value for q i (1) for each GenCo i -a non-negative setting for β in (18) determines a temperature cooling rate T i for each GenCo i. Low β values correspond to high temperature cooling rates, and conversely. Table I reports experimental findings for Avg DNE under alternative values for α and β. Fig. 9 provides a heat-map depiction of these Avg DNE findings.
An interesting "sweet spot" pattern is immediately evident in Fig. 9 : namely, the (α,β) combinations associated with the highest Avg DNE outcomes are along a nonlinear ridge line spanning combinations from (high,high)=(1,100) in the northwest corner to (low,moderate)=(1/24,2) in the southcentral region. What causes this nonlinear coupled dependence of Avg DNE on α and β?
A high α value reflecting an optimistically high initial earnings aspiration tends to induce experimentation with alternative action choices due to "disappointment" with the actual net earnings outcomes resulting from early action choices (reflected in large drops in propensity values for these chosen actions). Experimentation can facilitate the eventual discovery of good actions. Conversely, a low α value reflecting a pessimistically low initial earnings aspiration tends to induce premature fixation on an early action choice due to the unexpectedly high earnings outcome resulting from this choice (refelected in a large increase in the propensity value for this chosen action).
Nevertheless, these α effects can be amplified or offset by β effects. A high β value (low T value) amplifies the tendency to premature fixation by amplifying differences in propensity levels across action choices. A moderately low β value can prevent premature fixation by dampening the effects of propensity changes on action choice probabilities. However, a sufficiently low β value results in action choice probability distributions that are essentially uniform across the GenCo's action domain, negating all of the GenCo's efforts to learn which actions result in highest daily net earnings. This deleterious effect is seen in the uniformly low Avg DNE outcomes achieved in Table I and Fig. 9 for the lowest tested β levels 1 and 1/2.
Based on the Avg DNE findings presented in Table I and depicted in Fig. 9 , we use the sweet-spot VRE learning parameter settings (α, β) = (1,100) in all of the capacitywithholding experiments reported in Section V. 8 
V. REPORT OF KEY FINDINGS FOR CAPACITY WITHHOLDING A. Benchmark Case: No Physical Capacity Withholding
This subsection presents findings for dynamic 5-bus test case experiments in which the GenCos can exercise economic capacity withholding but not physical capacity withholding. That is, the GenCos can learn over time to report higher-thantrue marginal cost functions, but each GenCo i always reports a maximum operating capacity equal to its true maximum operating capacity Cap U i . 9 Table II reports Avg DNE outcomes for each GenCo i, as well as overall Avg DNE, calculated for day D=100. Results are reported for R values ranging from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand).
Consider, first, the results for R=0.0. Not surprisingly, GenCo 3 attains the highest Avg DNE. As seen from Fig. 6 , GenCo 3 is located within a potential "load pocket". Indeed, the branch connecting Bus 1 to Bus 2 is typically congested around the peak demand hour 17, and GenCo 3 exploits the resulting load-pocket opportunity by engaging in substantial economic capacity withholding.
GenCo 5 has the largest operating capacity and it is committed at a higher power output each day, on average, than GenCo 3. However, it does not end up with as high a mark-up over true marginal cost as GenCo 3 and hence attains a lower Avg DNE. GenCo 4 is committed at about half of its operating capacity at a moderate mark-up over true marginal cost, on average, and the Avg DNE of GenCo 4 is approximately the same as for GenCo 5. 8 For completeness and replicability purposes, we also note here that the following parameter settings for action domain construction were used in the Section V experiments for each GenCo i: M1 i =10; M2 i =10; M3 i =1 (experiments with no physical capacity withholding); M3 i =10 (experiments with physical capacity withholding); RIMin C i = 1 (experiments with no physical capacity witholding); RIMin C i =0.95 (experiments with a maximum of 5% physical capacity withholding permitted); and RIMin C i =0.90 (experiments with a maximum of 10% physical capacity withholding permitted). The cardinality of the action domain for each GenCo i is determined as the product M i of M1 i , M2 i , and M3 i . See Sun and Tesfatsion [5] for a detailed description of action domain construction for the AMES GenCos. 9 More precisely, each GenCo i's action domain AD i consists of 100 possible supply offers. Each possible supply offer is a "marginal cost" function that lies on or above GenCo i's true marginal cost function and that spans GenCo i's true operating capacity interval [Cap L ,Cap U ].
Finally, the two smallest-capacity GenCos 1 and 2 are both located at Bus 1, hence they are in direct rivalry with each other. Moreover, the branch connecting Bus 1 to Bus 2 exhibits persistent congestion around the peak demand hour 17, hence GenCos 1 and 2 are partially blocked from servicing the demand at Busses 2, 3, and 4 during this peak demand time. Consequently, GenCos 1 and 2 are committed at relatively low power outputs at relatively low mark-ups over true marginal cost, on average, and both attain relatively low Avg DNEs.
Table II also shows that the individual Avg DNE i for each GenCo i dramatically declines as R increases from 0.0 to 1.0. However, these declines are at different rates for different GenCos, resulting in changes in their shares in overall Avg DNE.
For example, given R=0.0 (100% fixed demand), GenCo 5's share of Avg DNE is smaller than that of GenCo 3 despite having the largest operating capacity of all GenCos. However, given R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand), GenCo 5 has the highest share of Avg DNE of all GenCos; it is now being committed at the highest power level, and this outweighs the fact that GenCo 5 is exercising less economic capacity withholding than GenCo 3.
The underlying reason for these relative changes in fortune is that total demand substantially declines in moving from R=0.0 to R=1.0. All GenCos are forced to compete with each other for the reduced demand. Eventually, all GenCos lose their pivotal supplier status, and any GenCo aggressively engaging in economic capacity withholding risks being undercut by rival supply offers. In particular, GenCos with relatively low true marginal costs are more favored in this environment since higher-cost GenCos could fail to be committed at all.
B. Common Maximum Physical Capacity Withholding Rates
This subsection presents findings for dynamic 5-bus test case experiments in which the GenCos can exercise physical capacity withholding as well as economic capacity withholding. More precisely, the GenCos can report supply offers for which their reported maximum operating capacities are strictly less than their true maximum operating capacities by a percentage no greater than a maximum shrinkage rate, either 5% or 10%. 10 Table III reports GenCo average % capacity shrinkages and % Avg DNE changes (relative to the benchmark case of no physical capacity withholding) calculated for day D=100 when the maximum shrinkage rate is 5%. Results are reported under systematically varied demand conditions ranging from R=0.0 (100% fixed demand) to R=1.0 (100% price-sensitive demand). The results in Table III display several regularities, as follows:
• For each R value, each GenCo's average % capacity shrinkage is well below the maximum shrinkage rate. 10 More precisely, each GenCo i's action domain AD i consists of 1000 possible supply offers. GenCo i can choose from among 10 equally-spaced shrinkage rates s from 0% to the maximum shrinkage rate. Each shrinkage rate s has the form s = 100%·[
, which determines a reported maximum operating capacity Cap RU (s). For each shrinkage rate s there are 100 possible supply offers, each consisting of a "marginal cost" function that lies on or above GenCo i's true marginal cost function and that spans the operating capacity interval [Cap L ,Cap RU (s)].
• For each R value, the five GenCos have similar average % capacity shrinkages.
• For each R value, the % Avg DNE change is positive for some GenCos and negative for others (relative to benchmark). The latter net earnings finding reflects how extraordinarily difficult it is for individual GenCos operating in dynamic wholesale power markets with multiple rivals to ensure that strategic changes in their reported supply offers indeed result in higher average daily net earnings for themselves.
For example, for R=0.0, GenCo 1, GenCo 2, and GenCo 5 attain higher average daily net earnings (relative to benchmark) while GenCo 3 and GenCo 4 substantially lose ground. Examining the micro data, it is seen that GenCo 1, GenCo 2, and GenCo 5 are being committed on average at somewhat higher power levels (relative to benchmark) while, at the same time, the LMPs at their busses are higher as well (relative to benchmark). In contrast, GenCo 3 and GenCo 4 are being committed on average at somewhat smaller power levels (relative to benchmark) and the LMPs at their busses are much lower (relative to benchmark).
LMPs and power commitments are, of course, system outcomes determined by the totality of demand bids and supply offers reported into the day-ahead market in interaction with nonlinear power flow on the grid. They are not under the control of individual GenCos, yet they determine the individual daily net earnings of these GenCos.
The pattern of findings seen in Table III for a 5% maximum shrinkage rate is also seen in Table IV, which repeats the  experiments of Table III for a 10% maximum shrinkage rate. In addition, the following regularities are also evident:
• For each R value, each GenCo i's average % capacity shrinkage under a 10% maximum shrinkage rate is almost twice its average % capacity shrinkage under a 5% maximum shrinkage rate.
• Nevertheless, for each R value, each GenCo i's % Avg DNE change is very similar in sign and magnitude no matter which maximum shrinkage rate is in effect. Given the latter finding, in the next subsection focusing on capacity withholding by a single GenCo we only report results for the case of a 5% maximum shrinkage rate.
C. Physical Capacity Withholding by a Single GenCo
This subsection presents average % capacity shrinkages and % Avg DNE changes (relative to the benchmark no-shrinkage case) calculated for day D=100 in dynamic 5-bus test case experiments in which only a single GenCo engages in capacity shrinkage. The maximum shrinkage rate is fixed at 5%.
Specifically, in Table V the single Genco is the relatively cheap and small GenCo 1. In Table VI the single GenCo is the relatively more expensive and large GenCo 3. And in Table VII the single Genco is the relative cheap yet largest GenCo 5.
Comparing the eighteen R/GenCo cases presented in these three tables, the following intriguing regularities are seen:
• For the set of cases corresponding to any one R value, all of the GenCos engaging in capacity shrinkage have similar average % capacity shrinkages well below the maximum permitted shrinkage rate of 5%; yet their % Avg DNE changes (relative to benchmark) are highly dissimilar.
• For many cases, the single GenCo engaging in capacity shrinkage has a negative % Avg DNE change (relative to benchmark). This is particularly true for cases involving GenCo 1 and GenCo 5.
• For almost all cases, at least one GenCo not engaging in capacity shrinkage has a positive % Avg DNE change (relative to benchmark). This is particularly true when GenCo 1 engages in capacity shrinkage.
• For no case is it true either that all GenCos end up having a positive % Avg DNE change (relative to benchmark) or that all GenCos end up having a negative % Avg DNE change (relative to benchmark). A clear understanding of these results must await a more extensive examination of outcomes at a micro level. Yet one implication seems clear. Capacity withholding has interesting cross-effects that could potentially be exploited by GenCos who own multiple generation plants located at multiple busses.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Restructured wholesale power markets are sequential openended games. A careful explanation of the findings presented in Section V will thus require a detailed micro examination of learning behaviors and market interactions over time.
For example, maximum potential total demand (12) in our dynamic 5-bus test case experiments is always less than 90% of the true total operating capacity of the five GenCos. Even during peak demand times when congestion partially blocks relatively cheap generation at Bus 1 from servicing demand at Busses 2, 3, and 4 there is always enough potential operating capacity to satisfy demand. Consequently, it would seem that strategic capacity withholding to induce higher net earnings should not be a serious problem.
What is missing from this high-level analysis, however, is a determination of the pivotal supplier status of different GenCos with regard to fixed demand, meaning that fixed demand cannot be met without their operating capacity. Pivotal supplier status relative to fixed demand implies substantial opportunities for the exercise of market power through capacity withholding. An additional complicating aspect is that capacity withholding on the part of some GenCos can induce pivotal supplier status (and higher net earnings) for others. This issue will be addressed in future studies.
APPENDIX A VRE REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
This section describes the implementation of the VRE reinforcement learning algorithm for an arbitrary AMES(V2.01) GenCo i.
Suppose it is the beginning of the initial day D=1. Each GenCo i must choose an action (supply offer) from its action domain AD i to report to the ISO for the day-ahead market in day D+1, where AD i consists of M i possible actions.
The initial propensity of GenCo i to choose action m ∈ AD i is given by q im (1) for m = 1,...,M i . AMES(V2.01) permits the user to set these initial propensity levels to any real numbers. However, the assumption used in this study is that GenCo i's initial propensity levels are all set equal to some common value q i (1), as follows:
Now consider the beginning of any day D ≥ 1, and suppose the current propensity of GenCo i to choose action m in AD i is given by q im (D). The choice probabilities that GenCo i uses to select an action for day D are then constructed from these propensities as follows:
In (20), T i is a temperature cooling rate that affects the degree to which GenCo i makes use of propensity values in determining its choice probabilities. As 
and m = m implies M i ≥ 2. The recency parameter r i in (21) determines the relative weight placed on past versus current daily net earnings payments in the updating of the action choice propensities over time. The experimentation parameter e i in (22) dampens the growth of the chosen action's propensity level. It also permits reinforcement to spill over to some extent from a chosen action to other actions to encourage continued experimentation with a wide variety of actions in the early stages of the learning process. 
